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Abstract 
 
 
This study analyses thousands of corporate annual reports and financial data from 1960-2000 to propose an 
early history of the term ‘shareholder value’ in the United States. Scholarly interest in ‘shareholder value’ has 
burgeoned since 2000, but still little is known about the term’s origins. My findings suggest that corporate 
managers’ intentional and repeated use of the term did not begin until the early 1980s and was not 
widespread until the 1990s. Further, my analysis of General Electric Corporation, Johnson & Johnson, and 
The Coca-Cola Company suggests that adopting ‘shareholder value’ rhetoric likely had little impact on the 
performance of these case study firms.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
For three decades, the term ‘shareholder value’ has attracted great amounts of 
attention in the literature. Considering the frequent use of the term, surprisingly little 
is known about its history. In this study I offer new insight to when and how the term 
‘shareholder value’ became prominent among U.S. corporate managers. I investigate 
two questions: first, when and in what context did ‘shareholder value’ emerge; and 
second, did the emergence of ‘shareholder value’ affect corporate strategy and 
governance? 
Colin Mayer argues shareholder value at its basic level is a straightforward 
concept: “shareholders own the corporation and, not unreasonably, they therefore 
expect their employees to run the corporation in their interest.”1 But because value is 
inherently subjective, specific shareholder interests are difficult to define, let alone 
measure.2 For this reason, most studies, including this paper, use financial gains 
achieved as a result of owning corporate stock as a proxy for these interests.  
‘Shareholder value’ was a fairly new term in managerial lexicons beginning in 
the 1980s. Even younger is the academic assessment of the concept and its effects on 
macroeconomic trends.3 The majority of these assessments, which will be reviewed, 
are narratives that argue the rise of ‘shareholder value’ drove managers to 
imprudently promote shareholder interests while harming employee, customer, and 
societal well-being.4  
These shareholder value narratives rely on macroeconomic evidence to support 
theories of changing corporate strategy and governance.5 Indeed, macroeconomic 
trends clearly indicate corporations underwent great change in this period.6 But what 
remains unclear—thus suggesting a weakness in today’s narratives—is whether the 
shareholder value concept was indeed the catalyst of these changes. Macroeconomic 
evidence is inappropriate as support for a theory of corporate change because 
decisions to alter corporate strategy and governance would certainly have occurred at 
the individual firm level. 
The unique contribution of this study is a microeconomic analysis of the rise of 
‘shareholder value.’ This analysis is divided into three sections. I first analyse when 
                                                 
1 Mayer (2013, p. 27) 
2 These debates discussing the role of the corporation are important but are outside the scope of 
this study. An example is the debate on whether or not corporations ought to engage in corporate 
social responsibility. 
3 William Lazonick and Mary O’Sullivan’s 2000 paper “Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New 
Ideology for Corporate Governance” was one of the first to argue that managers’ pursuit of 
‘shareholder value’ affected macroeconomic trends. 
4 See, for example, Chassagnon and Hollandts (2014), Lazonick (2014), Lazonick (2010a), and 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000). This is not to say shareholder value does not have its defenders, e.g. 
Vermaelen (2009). 
5 Lazonick (2000), Lazonick (2010b). There are exceptions to the rule. For example, Dial and 
Murphy (1995) presents a case study approach of how General Dynamics Corporation employed new 
management strategies in the 1990s to combat a decline in profitability. 
6 Poterba (2000) demonstrates the rise of corporate profit and shareholder returns; Bagwell and 
Shoven (1989) discuss and foretell increases in share repurchases as a means of enriching 
shareholders; data such as those in Economic Report of the President (2000, Table B-88, p.409) 
indicate increased shareholder enrichment, 1960-2000. 
and in what context managers began to use the term ‘shareholder value’ in corporate 
annual reports. Having thus established when the concept of shareholder value 
emerged, the second and third sections assess to what extent the rise of ‘shareholder 
value’ affected corporate governance decisions for three large case study 
corporations: General Electric Company, Johnson & Johnson, and the Coca-Cola 
Company. I use the ‘retain-and-reinvest’ and ‘downsize-and distribute’ elements of 
Lazonick’s narrative as criteria to gauge whether or not the shareholder value 
concept influenced corporate governance decisions.7 Specifically, I investigate 
whether the rise of ‘shareholder value’ may have changed managers’ preferences for 
shareholding versus non-shareholding constituencies (i.e. other stakeholders). I test 
this by analysing the language of the three corporations’ annual reports and then their 
financial statistics.  
My findings suggest that narratives connecting the rise of ‘shareholder value’ and 
macroeconomic trends without supporting microeconomic evidence should be 
treated with intense scepticism. These narratives misrepresent the timing of the 
term’s arrival on the corporate stage and likely overstate the significance of its actual 
effects on corporate strategy and governance decisions. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Contemporary ‘Shareholder Value’ Narratives 
A major contributor to the late twentieth-century business history literature, 
William Lazonick argues that a business model is comprised of strategic, 
organisational, and financial components.8 According to Lazonick, the shareholder 
value concept drove managers to change each of these components to favour 
shareholders’ interests.9 He believes this change was revolutionary in the likes the of 
the Chandlerian managerial, vertically-integrated firm.10 Lazonick argues that 
beginning in the 1970s Chandler’s “old-economy business model…began to break 
down”11 and that corporations moved from a strategy of “retain and reinvest”—
characterised by high investment in research, plant and equipment, and personnel—
to one of “downsize and distribute,”12 in which managers cut their labour force and 
distributed cash to shareholders in the name of “superior economic performance.”13 
In short, Lazonick argues short-term shareholders reaped benefits at the expense of 
other stakeholders, including long-term shareholders, in this period.  
                                                 
7 Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) and Lazonick (2014) argue that in the 1970s and 1980s 
corporations imprudently distributed corporate resources to shareholders (downsize-and-distribute) 
instead of reinvesting those resources internally (retain-and-reinvest). 
8 Lazonick (2010a, 678) 
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid. Chandler (1977) argued that technological and legal developments facilitated a separation 
of ownership and control, which allowed firms to grow extremely large in their scale and scope of 
output. 
11 Ibid. (p. 677) 
12 Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000, p. 17-18); Lazonick (2014, p. 3) 
13 Lazonick (2008, p 480) 
Lazonick argues the effect of the shareholder value concept’s downsize-and-
distribute thinking “had detrimental effects for overall economic performance.”14 He 
clearly documents independent macroeconomic trends such as increases in 
shareholder returns and share repurchases and decreased research and development 
expenditure.15 His next steps, though, are dubious. He documents increasingly 
unequal income distribution, increased levels of unemployment, higher executive 
compensation, and decreasing wage to productivity ratios. Then he simply argues the 
rise of the shareholder value concept is to blame for these trends.16 Thus he presents 
evidence that (1) the shareholder value concept influenced managers and corporate 
governance, and (2) that there were changing macroeconomic trends in the 1970s 
and 1980s. His assumption that the two are linked is quite a logical leap. 
Lazonick’s tells this history of the concept through the theoretical academic 
literature rather than actual management decisions. He cites the rise of agency theory 
in the financial economics literature as the source of the shareholder value concept. 
Ross (1973) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) are two early papers that identify 
corporate managers as the agents of shareholders, or the ‘principals.’17 Expanding on 
the work of Alchian and Demsetz,18 Jensen over time supported to the notion that the 
contract structure of the firm does not adequately discipline managers because they 
have incentives to “cause firms to grow beyond the optimal size” and to increase 
“the resources under their control.”19 Jensen specifically takes issue with how 
managers allocate free cash flows for unproductive projects or perquisites rather than 
for the most profitable pursuits.20 Jensen’s contribution to the corporate governance 
debate was the recommendation that managers “disgorge” this free cash flow to 
shareholders rather than investing or spending it unproductively.21 Thus, Jensen 
argues, managers’ incentives ought to be aligned with those of shareholders through 
stock-based pay.22  
Macroeconomic evidence indicates that corporations did indeed “disgorge” cash 
as Jensen suggested.23 Lazonick may be correct that these academic arguments at 
least to some extent influenced corporate managers. What is not clear, though, is at 
what point in time and to what extent agency theory indeed mattered. Johan Heilbron 
et al. (2013) analyse citation counts for Jensen Meckling’s 1976 paper and determine 
the papers did not gain traction in the financial economics literature until 1987.24 
Unless agency theory influenced managers before it influenced academics—an 
                                                 
14 Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000, p. 30) 
15 Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000, p. 19-27) 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ross (1973); Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
18 Alchian and Demstz (1972) laid the foundation for the theory of the firm as a nexus of 
contracts.  
19 Jensen (1986, p. 323) 
20 Ibid.; Jensen (1988) 
21 Jensen (1986, p. 323) 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. I use Jensen’s term ‘disgorge’ throughout this study. My discussion of macroeconomic 
evidence is in 2.2 
24 Heilbron et al. (2013, p. 22). Before 1987 there were very few citations of Jensen and 
Meckling’s paper in The Journal of Financial Economics: two in 1978, three in 1983, three in 1985, 
and one in 1986. In 1987 the paper was cited nine times and was cited at least ten times 1988-1990 
unlikely scenario—then Jensen and Meckling’s arguments were probably not 
performative until the late 1980s. 
The role of macroeconomic and microeconomic evidence 
It is evident United States corporate financial trends transformed in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Specifically, there is abundant evidence that corporations altered the way 
they engaged their shareholders. Corporations began to repurchase their own stock 
more aggressively, which contributed to the return of larger percentages of net 
income to shareholders by inflating the stock price.25 For example, in 1972 U.S. 
corporations returned 42% of their net income to shareholders in the form of 
dividends and share repurchases.26 By 1990 this fraction had risen to 75%.27 Among 
the reasons corporations were motivated to repurchase shares were lacking superior 
investment opportunities, to favourably balance leverage, or simply to transfer 
corporate wealth to shareholders.28 Indeed, in this period managers began to use 
share repurchases to supplement or substitute for dividends as the means of 
distributing cash to shareholders.29  
Macroeconomic analysis is of course necessary to understand corporate trends, 
but only firm-level analysis can assess what were the specific management decisions 
that may have influenced this change. Macroeconomic analysis can only demonstrate 
a change occurred. Thus authors linking management decisions to macroeconomic 
trends rely heavily on their assumptions. 
Firm-level analysis, though, may suffer from opposite issues. Individual case 
studies have the potential to convey detailed information about managers’ decisions 
and the motives behind them, but one cannot be certain to what extent each case 
study is representative of other corporations. 
The emergence of the shareholder value concept 
Without this firm-level analysis into managers’ actual decisions, the question of 
precisely when shareholder value emerged remains unanswered. This is why 
business historians including Lazonick cannot point to a specific date or event to as 
the onset of the shareholder value concept. Instead, what is common in the literature 
is to identify a general time period as when the ideology took firm hold in 
corporations. For example, Ralph Gomory and Richard Sylla simply argue that “in 
the period from the 1980s to the present” there was a “major shift away from a broad 
view of stakeholder interests to an almost exclusive focus on shareholder value.”30 
Steven Pearlstein argues Milton Friedman “first articulated the idea” in his famous 
1971 The New York Times Magazine article ‘The Social Responsibility of Business 
is to Increase its Profits,’31 but Pearlstein argues the shareholder value concept 
                                                 
25 Bagwell and Shoven (1989, p. 130, 137) 
26Weston and Siu (2002, p. 43). 1972 is the earliest available year in this dataset. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Boudry et al. (2013, p. 24-25); Wansley et al. (1989, p. 97-98) 
29 Bagwell and Shoven (1989, p. 131) 
30 Gomory and Sylla (2013, p. 108) 
31 Pearlstein (2014, p. 6) citing Friedman (1971) 
arrived ‘in the 1970s and 1980s.”32 Similarly, Lazonick points to “the late 1970s” as 
the onset of the shareholder value concept began but not to a specific date.33  
Other studies point not to the origins but rather to a moment when it was clear 
the shareholder value concept had become dominant in corporate governance. For 
example, Virgile Chassagnon and Xavier Hollandts point to the year 2000 as the date 
when shareholders’ interests reigned supreme.34 Lynn Stout claims that by the turn 
of the twenty-first century, the shareholder value concept had reached its “zenith.”35 
This was the year when legal scholars Reinier Kraakman and Henry Hansmann 
argued “ultimate control over the corporation” rested with “the shareholder class”; 
other stakeholders such as customers and employees “should have their interests 
protected by contractual and regulatory means.”36Although it is certainly valuable to 
know the shareholder value concept was dominant by the year 2000, without an 
understanding of when the concept first emerged and then gained prominence 
scholars cannot identify at precisely what point the concept may have begun to 
influence macroeconomic outcomes.  
The most specific analysis of the emergence of ‘shareholder value’ is a 2013 
study by Johan Heilbron et al.37 In this study the authors analyse the usage frequency 
of the term ‘shareholder value’ over time in The Wall Street Journal newspaper and 
find that the term was not widely used until the mid-1980s.38 This study has two 
principal weaknesses. The first is the use of The Wall Street Journal as a data source: 
although the newspaper “is considered to be fairly reliable for corporate 
developments in corporate America,” changes in the articles and advertisements in 
the newspaper represent changes in the rhetoric of journalists rather than of actual 
managers. The second weakness is that the authors limit their analysis to use of the 
term ‘shareholder value’ but exclude substitute terms such as ‘share owner value’ 
and ‘stockholder value,’ which managers frequently used to describe the same 
concept. Despite these weaknesses, their basic research framework is strong, and I 
use their method as a foundation for my analysis.  
 The literature has thus produced theories of how the rise of the shareholder 
value concept affected corporate governance. Also well documented are the 
macroeconomic changes of corporate financial variables. What is lacking is 
qualitative empirical evidence that connects these macroeconomic changes with the 
management concept of ‘shareholder value.’ The rest of this study provides new 
insight to begin to fill these voids in the literature.  
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
 Having established that the current literature’s account of the emergence of 
the term ‘shareholder value’ is inadequate; I thus provide a more precise analysis of 
                                                 
32 Ibid. (p. 5) 
33 Lazonick (2014, p. 5) 
34 Chassagnon and Hollandts (2014, p. 47) 
35 Stout (2012, p. 21) 
36 Ibid. citing Kraakman and Hansmann (2001) 
37 Heilbron et al. (2013) 
38 Ibid. (p. 23-24) 
when and how shareholder value rhetoric emerged in the United States. I do so by 
analysing corporate annual reports and corporate financial statistics as evidence.  
Annual reports are suitable data for two reasons. First, the reports are the product 
of corporate managers, which means the text offers direct insight into the managers’ 
thoughts and intentions. Second, they offer these snapshots of corporate management 
at regular intervals. There are potential issues with the reliability of information in 
annual reports because of their subjectivity. For example, managers may “cover up” 
poor performance to enhance their image in the annual reports.39 I do not think this 
subjectivity will bias my results because use of shareholder value rhetoric reflects 
managers’ intentions rather than their performance. 
The composition of a conventional corporate annual report is as follows. The 
report generally opens with a brief summary of the firm’s financial activity and 
accomplishments of the past year in the form of a letter to shareholders, which is 
signed by a high-level manager such as the Chief Executive Officer or Chairman of 
the Board.40 After this letter, the reports usually highlight various aspects of the 
corporation’s activity over the past year, which may include topics such as strategies, 
investments, research breakthroughs, and structural changes. Financial statements 
and an audit report, which are products of an independent third party rather than the 
management, are typically toward the end of the report. Management’s discussion of 
the year’s financial statements either precedes or follows the financial statements. 
I determine as precisely as possible when the term ‘shareholder value’ was first 
used in an annual report and then when it became extensively used. To do so I use 
the ProQuest Historical Annual Reports database to conduct a text search of a very 
large sample of corporate annual reports.41 I searched all annual reports in the 
database for the term ‘shareholder value,’ as well as all substitute terms including 
‘share holder value,’ ‘shareowner value,’ ‘share owner value,’ ‘stockholder value,’ 
‘stock holder value,’ ‘stockowner value,’ and ‘stock owner value.’42 I then sort the 
results by date and determine when were the earliest uses of the term, when the term 
was used more extensively, and in what context early users employed the term. 
Because the numbers of reports varies each year, I analyse the percentage of 
corporations in the database that used these term in each year rather than the simple 
raw count. The large sample size suggests the trends I describe are reliable.43 
Next, I determine how the emergence of shareholder value may have affected 
managers’ treatment of shareholders versus other stakeholders. Due to space 
constraints I limit my analysis to three case study corporations: The Coca-Cola 
Company (KO), General Electric Company (GE), and Johnson and Johnson (JNJ), 
which I chose deliberately: all three corporations were among the largest industrial 
                                                 
39 Murphy and Zimmerman (1993, p. 275) 
40 Some corporations experimented with addressing the letter to numerous stakeholders. For 
example, in 1997 GE addressed their opening letter to ‘share owners and employees’ and in 1998 to 
‘shareholders, employees, and customers’ 
41 The ProQuest Historical Annual Reports database “contains over 1.3 million pages from over 
43,000 annual reports from over 800 companies.” Reports date from 1844-2012, and most reports are 
from the last fifty years. 
42 From this point forward, any mention of ‘shareholder value’ includes these substitute terms. 
43 From 1960-69, 1970-79, 1980-89, and 1990-99 there were on average 636, 630, 418, and 299 
reports per year, respectively. 
firms in the United States from 1960-2000 and the growth trends of their net incomes 
closely resemble the national corporate average. I selected GE and KO because they 
are cited as paragons of the shareholder value management concept.44 I selected JNJ 
because of its entirely dissimilar stated management strategy: JNJ explicitly pledged 
to treat shareholders as the most peripheral of their corporate beginning in 1963. 
Because JNJ’s stated corporate governance model emphasised customers, suppliers, 
employees, and society above shareholders, I treat JNJ as a control; they represent 
the opposite of the shareholder value management concept. 
I analyse how these three corporations’ annual reports and financial statistics 
changed relative to three points in time, which I call critical years. The first, year DD 
(downsize-and-distribute), represents Lazonick’s general claim that U.S. 
corporations began to exude shareholder value maximising behaviour in the late 
1970s.45 The second, year RP (repurchase), represents the first recorded year the 
corporation repurchased its own stock shares. The final point in time, year SH 
(shareholder), represents the first year the corporation used the term ‘shareholder 
value’ in an annual report. Table 1 exhibits the critical years for each case study 
corporation. 
TABLE 1 
DEFINITION OF CRITICAL YEARS 
 DD RP SH 
 Late 1970s 
First recorded 
share repurchase 
First use of 
“SHV”  
GE 1978 1978 1994 
JNJ 1978 1984 1993 
KO 1978 1984 1984 
 
I determine if changes to any variables—rhetorical or financial—occurred before 
or after these critical years. Analysing general trends may suggest that a change 
occurred, but this more precise analysis will allow me to argue what may or may not 
have contributed to this change. For example, if usage of the term ‘profit’ increased 
in frequency before the year SH, then it is unlikely that the adoption of shareholder 
rhetoric affected a corporation’s focus on profits.   
I first analyse the emergence and context of the term ‘shareholder value’ in the 
three case study corporations. The objective is to establish when and in what context 
the term was adopted for each corporation. I then determine how frequently 
managers mentioned various corporate constituencies and if these frequencies 
changed following any of the critical years. 
To investigate when and in what context each corporation used ‘shareholder 
value’ I used the ProQuest Historical Annual Reports database to access and 
download the corporate annual reports for GE, JNJ, and KO for 41 years from 1960-
2000. I then used optimal character recognition software to transform the files, which 
were downloaded as images, into searchable text files. With few exceptions the 
                                                 
44 See, for example, Lazonick anad O’Sullivan (2000, p. 23-24); Pearlstein (2014, p. 18) 
45 Lazonick (2014, p. 5) 
reports were available and the text in the original files from the ProQuest database 
was clear enough for the software to fully recognise. Only the GE annual report for 
1961, JNJ annual reports for 1989 and 1990 and the KO reports for 1960-1965 and 
1995 are excluded from analysis because either they were unavailable in the 
ProQuest database or the software found them illegible.  
I searched each annual report to determine how frequently corporations used 
seven different terms, each of which I argue represents a particular corporate 
constituency. Table 2 exhibits the words chosen and their representative corporate 
constituency.  
 
TABLE 2  
KEY TERMS AND REPRESENTATIVE CONSTITUENCIES 
Term Corporate constituency 
‘shareholder’ Shareholders 
‘shareholder value’ Shareholders  
‘profit’ Shareholders 
‘employee’ Employees 
‘research’ Corporation’s future 
‘customer’ Customers 
 
My searches for ‘shareholder’ and ‘shareholder value’ also include the substitute 
terms for ‘shareholder.’ In the count for ‘shareholder’ I am only interested in 
references to the shareholder entity; thus I exclude from the count uses of specific 
accounting terms such as ‘shareholder equity.’  
It is necessary to adjust the data beyond the raw count of number of uses for two 
reasons. First, the length of the reports and their level of detail increased 
substantially between 1960-2000. Second, the financial statements and audit report 
sections of the reports are not the management’s creation and thus should not be 
considered in analysis of management rhetoric. Therefore, it is necessary to adjust 
the data beyond a raw count of simple number. To determine F(p)(t), the number of 
times phrase p appears per 100 pages of strictly management-produced text in year (t), I use the following formula, 
 
𝐹(𝑝)(𝑡) = 100 𝑓(𝑝)
𝑇 − 𝐴
 
 
where f is the number of uses of phrase (p) in management-produced text, A is the 
number of pages in the auditor’s report, and T is the total number of pages in the 
report.    
I assume that a higher F(p)(t) for phrases representing one constituency indicates 
an increase in the level of management’s commitment to that constituency’s 
interests. For example, if in period t-10 to t there was a noticeable increase in 
F(‘shareholder’) and a decline in F(‘employee’) then I assume that managers’ 
preferences changed from t-10 to t to favour shareholder interests over employee 
interests. 
I then analyse trends in the three case study corporations’ financial statistics. 
Specifically, I analyse the values for total dividend payments; share repurchases; 
research and development; and property, plant, and equipment expenditures as a 
fraction of net income. Financial data are inherently subject to countless exogenous 
factors such as macroeconomic activity and industry and technology trends. As a 
result, changes in financial trends cannot be entirely attributed to shifting attitudes or 
preferences of managers. For example, a manager may set a goal for the 
corporation’s profits or share price, but the manager cannot determine those values 
outright. Therefore I take two steps to isolate managers’ preferences in financial 
data. First, I only analyse financial variables whose value is the product of managers’ 
discretion. Managers directly determine the allocation of net income and cash, so I 
analyse various expenditure variables.46 Second, I isolate variables from annual 
fluctuations in corporate performance or macroeconomic trends by analysing the 
variables as a fraction of net income instead of in absolute terms. Net income 
increased fairly consistently and monotonically from 1960-2000, and thus a change 
in dividend, repurchase, r&d, or ppe, represents a deliberate change in 
management’s decision of how to allocate net income.47 Table 3 defines these 
variables. 
 
TABLE 3 
 DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
 Downsize and Distribute      Retain and Reinvest 
 
RETURNS = returns to 
shareholders as dividends and 
repurchases 
REINVEST = reinvestment in 
corporation as R&D and PPE 
Variable dividend repurchase r&d ppe 
Definition Net income 
returned to 
shareholders 
via dividends 
(%) 
Net income 
returned to 
shareholders 
via 
repurchases 
(%) 
Net income 
spent on 
research and 
development 
(%) 
Net income 
spent on 
additions to 
property, 
plant, and 
equipment 
(%) 
Source Compustat 
database 
(DVT) 
Compustat 
database 
(PRSKTC) 
and annual 
reports 
Annual reports Compustat 
database 
(CAPX) 
Notes:  KO is not a research-intensive corporation and data for r&d are unavailable. Thus 
REINVEST for KO equals ppe. 
 
                                                 
46 Jensen (1986; 1988) 
47 Data from net income are from the Compustat database (variable NI). 
Relative increases increases in dividend48 and repurchase indicate downsize-and-
distribute behaviour; their sum equals RETURNS, cash distributed to shareholders. 
Relative increases in r&d and ppe indicate retain-and-reinvest; their sum equals 
REINVEST. Data for these variables are obtained from either corporate annual 
reports or the Compustat database.  
I plot value for variables RETURNS and REINVEST from 1960-2000 and analyse 
trends relative to the three critical years. 
 
THE EMERGENCE AND EARLY CONTEXT OF ‘SHAREHOLDER VALUE’  
 
First I demonstrate as precisely as possible when use of the term ‘shareholder 
value’ first appeared and then became a commonly appearing term in my sample of 
corporate annual reports. Second, I explain managers’ definition of ‘shareholder 
value’ in their earliest uses of the term and whether this definition changed over 
time. This insight frames the debate of how ‘shareholder value’ may have influenced 
corporate governance: the concept cannot be responsible for economic changes 
occurring before evidence of the concept existed. 
 
Emergence of shareholder value rhetoric  
My empirical findings largely corroborate those of Heilbron et al., who find that 
the first use of the term ‘shareholder value’ in The Wall Street Journal was in 1965 
and that the phrase was used sparingly before 1983.49 These data are exhibited in 
Figure 2. Heilbron et al. find that usage frequency rose sharply in the 1980s; over 
200 newspaper articles mentioned the term in both 1988 and 1989 compared to fewer 
than ten articles before 1983.50 After a short decline in the 1990s, there was a second 
wave with the “bull market of the 1990s.”51 
I find the first use of the term ‘shareholder value’ occurred in the ProQuest 
database in 1965. There was also a sharp increase in usage frequency beginning in 
approximately 1983. A third similarity with Heilbron et al.’s data is that they 
increased in two distinct periods. After a sharp rise from 1983-1987, the percentage 
of corporations in the database using ‘shareholder value’ remained at approximately 
30% until 1993. From 1993-2000 there was a second wave: at least 40% of 
corporations in the database used the term. It is likely that once a corporation began 
to use the term they continued to do so, which would explain why the data in Figure 
1 are generally monotonic whilst Heilbron et al.’s are not.52 
The increase in usage frequency from 1981-1985 is very important because the 
data move from near zero to over 50. A momentous change also occurred in the mid-
1990s: usage frequency increased more than threefold from 1992-97. These data 
suggest that the emergence of shareholder value rhetoric in corporations occurred in  
 
                                                 
48 This value is total dividend expenditure. Thus there is no need to account for stock splits, 
which occurred frequently among all three corporations in this period. 
49 Heilbron et al. (2014, p. 7) 
50 Ibid. (p. 7-8) 
51 Ibid. (p. 8) 
52 After 1995 the percentage of corporations using ‘shareholder value’ decreases slightly. 
 
FIGURE 1 
USAGE FREQUENCY OF ‘SHAREHOLDER VALUE’ IN PROQUEST 
HISTORCIAL ANNUAL REPORTS DATABASE (1960-2000) 
Source: ProQuest Historical Annual Reports database. 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
USAGE FREQUENCY OF ‘SHAREHOLDER VALUE’ IN THE WALL 
STREET JOURNAL (1965-2007) 
Source: Heilbron et al. (2014, p. 8).  
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two waves. Early users adopted the term in the early 1980s, but extensive use of the 
term did not occur until the mid-1990s.  
 
Early incidental uses of ‘shareholder value’ 
The first use of the term ‘shareholder value’ in a corporate annual report in the 
ProQuest database was in the 1965 report of Ling-Temco-Vought (LTV), a large 
conglomerate corporation.53 In this report, the corporation claims to arrange their 
assets and resources so as to “realize as much shareholder value possible.”54 Since 
this was LTV’s—and perhaps any corporation’s—first use of the term, the 
management thoroughly explains their use of the term:  
Our immediate and ultimate objectives are the same: to increase 
shareholder values for the owners of the company. “Values,” as a 
term, has many different applications. For the management of LTV, it 
has one overriding meaning - shareholder values. The shareholder 
owns the assets we manage; through his elected Board of Directors he 
approves or qualifies corporate policy. As owner, he accepts a share 
in the ultimate risk of proper asset utilization as well as a share in 
after-tax earnings and the growth of corporate financial strength. 
“Values” for him exist at two levels: (1) net worth or book value, and 
(2) market value, as established by the interaction of his fellow 
shareholders and the financial community in appraising the earning 
power of his investment. The primary responsibility of the corporate 
management of LTV is to build these “values” for the shareholder, 
realizing that in so doing we must do an outstanding job operating the 
company and of meeting or exceeding our commitments to customers, 
employees, and community alike.55 
The level of detail dedicated to explaining the shareholder value concept 
ostensibly suggests the use of the term was a premeditated corporate strategy. 
However, because the next use of ‘shareholder value’ in a LTV annual report does 
not occur until 1995, this is improbable. Instead, the management likely intended to 
emphasise their commitment to shareholders’ interests, and in this instance the use of 
the term ‘shareholder value’ is but a coincidence.  
There were two other incidental uses of the term ‘shareholder value’ in the late 
1960s. In their 1967 annual report, the management of American Standard, Inc., 
described their “objective of consistently increasingly shareholder value” but they 
failed to explain what ‘shareholder value’ is, nor did they explain how or why they 
intend to increase it.56 In 1968 the management of General Mills, Inc. wrote that it is 
“through consistent growth in earnings that shareholder value is created.”57 Although 
                                                 
53 In 1965 LTV was the 168th most valuable industrial firm in terms of revenues, according to 
Fortune Magazine’s annual list. Its highest ranking was in 1970, when it was ranked 14. By 2002 it 
was no longer on Fortune’s list of the 500 most valuable firms. 
54 Ling-Temco-Vought 1965 Annual Report (p. 6) 
55 Ibid. 
56 American Standard Annual Report (1967 p 4) 
57 General Mills (1968 p. 2) 
this use indicates an association between shareholder value and increased earnings 
per share, it offers no insight to how those earnings were to be achieved. 
Although LTV, American Standard, and General Mills were among the first to 
use the term ‘shareholder value’ in an annual report, none of them reprised their use 
of the term in future reports for over a decade. Thus although these corporations may 
indeed have sought to promote shareholders’ interests over this time period, their use 
of the term ‘shareholder value’ was not part of a premeditated mantra. It is thus not 
surprising that there is little explanation of specific steps the corporation intended to 
take for the sake of promoting shareholder value. 
 
Early intentional uses of ’shareholder value’ 
The first reports in the ProQuest database to use the term ‘shareholder value’ 
repeatedly and intentionally belong to Bendix, a large engineering corporation, 
which used the term in their 1973, 1974, 1977, 1980, and 1981 annual reports.58 In 
1973 Bendix claimed to “employ our human, technological, and financial resources 
in the manner best calculated to bring about a steady increase in shareholder 
value.”59 Not unlike the LTV, American Standard, and General Mills uses of the 
term in the 1960s, this as well as the 1974 use were arbitrary and appeared without 
an accompanying explanation. In the 1975 report, though, Bendix Chairman, 
President, and CEO W. M. Blumenthal explains the concept of ‘shareholder value.’ 
After declaring “healthy progress” in the areas Bendix uses “to gauge shareholder 
value and earnings capacity” Blumenthal goes on to describe changes in each of 
“earnings before extraordinary items”, “revenue increase,” “pretax margins”, 
“shareholders’ equity”, “return on equity”, “new plant, equipment, and technology”, 
and the “quarterly Common Stock dividend”.60 Heilbron et al. also recognise 
Blumenthal as an early user of shareholder value rhetoric. In a 1975 advertisement 
for Bendix in The Wall Street Journal Blumenthal wrote that the firm’s growth “has 
been directed not primarily to volume, but more specifically to what we call 
shareholder value.”61 It appears that Blumenthal was one of the earliest—and 
perhaps the first—proponent of ‘shareholder value’ as an explicitly defined corporate 
objective.  
These early uses of ‘shareholder value’ in Bendix annual reports described to 
position the corporation for both present and future earnings increases. This context 
of ‘shareholder value’ is in contrast to the literature’s conventional understanding 
that the term was used to describe short-term dividend increases and capital gains for 
shareholders at the expense of future growth prospects and other stakeholders’ 
interests.62 Heilbron et al. incorrectly paraphrase Blumenthal’s beliefs to be “creating 
shareholder value is more important than the company’s growth.”63 Heilbron et al.’s 
                                                 
58 Throughout the 1970s Bendix was ranked between 61 and 71 on Fortune Magazine’s list of the 
most valuable industrial firms by revenues. (FORTUNE 500 Archive). 
59 Bendix 1973 Annual Report (p. 2) 
60 Bendix 1975 Annual Report (p. 2. 
61 Heilbron et al. (2014, p. 9 citing The Wall Street Journal, 22 May 1975) 
62 See, for example, Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000); Lazonick (2000; 2010a; 2010b; 2014); 
Chassagnon and Hollandts (2014); Pearlstein (2014) 
63 Heilbron et al. (2014, p. 9) 
data offer inadequate insight to encapsulate Blumenthal’s views. More in-depth 
analysis of Blumenthal’s writings in his letters to shareholders shows that such a 
dichotomy between shareholder welfare and corporate and societal welfare did not 
exist. Blumenthal also recognises in a 1976 opinion piece in Dividend that a 
corporation can be “motivated by profit consideration and yet responsive to society’s 
larger needs and changes.”64 
The extent to which Blumenthal and his use of ‘shareholder value’ influenced 
other corporate managers is unknown. What is clear, though, is that from his very 
early use of the term there is harmony between increasing the financial value of the 
shareholders’ investments and maintaining commitment to other stakeholders. This 
definition of the term is conspicuously absent in contemporary literature. 
The second corporation in the ProQuest database to use the term ‘shareholder 
value’ repeatedly and intentionally was the Boise Cascade Corporation, a large pulp 
and paper corporation.65 Boise Cascade management used the term ‘shareholder 
value’ in their 1973, 1978, and 1979 annual reports. In their 1973 report, President 
and CEO John Ferry and Chairman Stephen Moser declared the corporation’s “goal 
of increasing shareholder value” and went on to explain “the elements of achieving 
that goal.”66 These elements included efficient operation, a flexible financial 
structure, compensating management relative to achieved return on equity, and 
“increasing productivity” by investing in the skills, knowledge, and working 
environment of employees.67 In the financial discussion section of their 1978 annual 
report Boise Cascade managers wrote, “improving return on equity is a key 
component for achieving our corporate goal of optimising shareholder value.”68 
Earlier in this same report, Fery and COO Jon Miller express in their letter to 
shareholders their confidence that “the company will continue to grow become more 
profitable and of even greater value to its shareholders and society” (sic).69 Miller 
wrote the letter to shareholder in the 1979 report and it ends with almost verbatim 
text.70 
These early but intentional uses of shareholder value are used in the context of 
overall stability and growth of the corporation. There is no indication that the 
promotion of shareholder value was to come at the expense of the interests of other 
stakeholders. 
 
The proliferation of ‘shareholder value’ in annual reports 
Dart and Kraft, Inc. and R.J. Reynolds Industries, Inc. were the first two 
corporations in the ProQuest database to repeatedly and consistently use shareholder 
value rhetoric in annual reports in the 1980s. By 1983 such a large number of 
corporations were using the term that it is beyond the scope of this study to analyse 
                                                 
64 Blumenthal (1976, p. 4-9) 
65 Throughout the decade 1970-1979 the Boise Cascade Corporation was ranked between 55 and 
143 on Fortune Magazine’s list of the most valuable industrial firms in terms of revenues. 
(FORTUNE 500 Archive) 
66 Bosie Cascade Corporation 1973 Annual Report (p. 4) 
67 Ibid. 
68 Boise Cascade Corporation 1978 Annual Report (p. 33) 
69 Ibid. (p. 4-5) 
70 Boise Cascade Corporation 1979 Annual Report (p. 5) 
in-depth the use of the term after this year. Instead, the following section offers a 
thorough analysis of the way three case study corporations used the term.  
Dart and Kraft, Inc., a valuable food and consumer products conglomerate, used 
the term ‘shareholder value’ in each annual report from 1982-1984 in the context of 
overall financial performance and growth, similar to uses of the term already 
described. In 1982 Dart and Kraft President Warren Batts and CEO John Richman 
declared the firm would “enhance shareholder value by attaining a maximum return 
on corporate assets coupled with retained earnings growth”.71 Batts and Richman 
declare this is achievable by having a “relative comparative advantage,” “increasing 
operating effectiveness,” and attaining “unit volume gains and market share 
growth.”72 Although this use of ‘shareholder value’ is in the context of short term 
financial statistics, the 1983 and 1983 reports indicate a perception of ‘shareholder 
value’ as a metric of long-term success as well. For example, in 1983 Batts and 
Richman explain the three avenues by which they would achieve their goal of 
“improving shareholder value”: first, by improving returns; second by “increasing 
real rate of growth” through acquisitions as well as investment in advertising, 
research and development, and capital expenditures; and third by “improving the 
quality and depth of management.”73 In the 1984 report, Batts and Richman devote 
an entire section of the letter to shareholders to the explanation of ‘shareholder 
value’, which in this case they explain more explicitly as improvement in “earnings 
growth and return on goal capital.”74 After listing this definition they outline a 
similar strategy for increasing shareholder value as the one in the 1983 report. In the 
1984 report, though, they emphasise their focus on “long-term growth” and 
commitment to research and development.75  
Reynolds Industries first used ‘shareholder value’ in their 1981 annual report and 
then again in 1983 and 1984. In their first use of the term they failed to explain the 
meaning of the term, simply claiming it would arise out of “competitive 
excellence.”76 The definition of the term in 1983, though, is indeed decipherable. 
CEO J. Tylee Wilson writes, “RJR’s progress in 1983 demonstrates our commitment 
to capitalize on our primary strengths to achieve substantially increased shareholder 
value.”77 He goes on explain those progressions similarly to the way Blumenthal 
explained shareholder value in the 1975 Bendix report. Wilson boasts of big picture 
and long-term goals including achieving growth in scope and in international 
presence.78 The result of these progressions, he writes, was a “7% increase in the 
quarterly dividend.”79 
 
                                                 
71 Dart and Kraft, Inc. 1982 Annual Report (p 4.) 
72 Ibid. 
73 Dart and Kraft, Inc. 1983 Annual Report (p. 4) 
74 Dart and Kraft, Inc. 1984 Annual Report (p. 6) 
75 Ibid. 
76 Reynolds Industries 1981 Annual Report (p. 4) 
77 Reynolds Industries 1983 Annual Report (p. 6) 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
Discussion 
Use of ‘shareholder value’ in reports in the ProQuest database first occurred in 
1965, but the term was likely not used as a premeditated corporate mantra until 1975. 
It was not until 1983 that more than two corporation used the term in an annual 
report in the same year. These early uses of the term, when clearly defined, generally 
described the financial condition of the firm, but more often as an indicator of overall 
corporate welfare than as a means of accomplishing short-term earnings. 
These findings have numerous important conclusions for the understanding of 
the shareholder value concept in contemporary literature. Regarding the timing of the 
term’s emergence, the finding that shareholder value rhetoric was not used by a large 
number of corporations until the mid-1980s, and still many more corporations’ did 
not adopt the term until the 1990s, suggests that ‘shareholder value’ was not a 
generally accepted management concept by the time early downsize-and-distribute 
behaviour began. Lazonick, Pearlstein, and others’ placement of the emergence of 
the shareholder value concept before 1983 are thus incorrect. 80 Arguments that use 
of the term occurred extensively before the 1990s likely overstates how widely the 
term was used during those years.  
Limitations of my analysis include the fact that it only explains the data in the 
ProQuest database. It is possible that there were early uses of ‘shareholder value’ in 
annual reports not available in the ProQuest database and are thus excluded. 
However, because the data sample is diverse and large, it is likely that the trend 
exhibited from these data is indeed representative of general corporate use. Some 
may argue that the date when a corporation adopted use of the term ‘shareholder 
value’ is ancillary because corporations were already engaging in downsize-and-
distribute behaviour. Critics of these managers, though, do not just argue that 
downsize-and-distribute behaviour existed; they argue that it was undertaken as part 
of new management strategies stemming from the new concept of shareholder value.   
 
CASE STUDIES, ANNUAL REPORT ANALYSIS 
 
In the previous section I determined when ‘shareholder value’ emerged in annual 
reports in the ProQuest database and in what context the term was used. The 
objective of the next two sections is to determine if management preferences 
exhibited a change in preference for shareholders over other stakeholders by 
changing from a pattern of retain-and-reinvest to one of downsize-and-distribute. 
In this section I analyse trends in GE, JNJ, and KO’s use of particular phrases in 
their annual reports; each phrase represents a corporate constituency. I then discuss 
to what extent these lexical changes may be indicative of a change from a pattern of 
retain-and-reinvest to one of downsize-and-distribute following the rise of the 
shareholder value concept.81 I define retain-and-reinvest as a relatively high focus on 
long-term corporate vitality and non-shareholding stakeholders’ interests, as 
indicated by use of the terms ‘employee,’ ‘research,’ and ‘customer.’ I define 
downsize-and-distribute as a relatively high focus on shareholder interests, as 
                                                 
80 Lazonick (2014; 2010) Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000); Pearlstein (2014) 
81 Lazonick (2000; 2014) 
indicated by use of the terms ‘shareholder,’ ‘shareholder value,’ and ‘profit.’ I 
analyse these lexical trends before and after the three critical years DD, RP, and SH 
 
Usage of ‘shareholder value’ in annual reports 
The emergence of the term ‘shareholder value’ occurred dissimilarly in timing 
and context for each of GE, JNJ, and KO. Of the three corporations, KO was both 
the first and the most frequent user of the term. KO’s usage frequency experienced 
an upward trend following adoption of the term in 1983. JNJ and GE did not mention 
the term until 1993 and 1994 respectively, and their usage was limited compared to 
that of KO. All three corporations employ different definitions for the term and use it 
in dissimilar contexts. 
 
THE COCA-COLA COMPANY 
Two features characterise KO’s usage of ‘shareholder value’ in the 1980s. The 
first is an unambiguous commitment to increasing shareholder value as the primary 
objective of management. The second is a consistency in the definition and context 
of the term. 
KO’s commitment to increasing shareholder value as a deliberate corporate 
objective is explicitly stated throughout its annual reports. With the initial mention of 
‘shareholder value’ in 1983 the management stated, “to maximize shareholder value” 
was “the core of the Company’s strategy.”82 In 1984, the commitment was made as 
obvious as possible when the management wrote on the front cover of the annual 
report the simple sentence, “To increase shareholder value is the objective driving 
this enterprise.”83 In this report the management refer to their 1981 corporate 
resturcturing during which they forthrightly agreed to “set a clear-cut strategy—to 
increase the value” of shareholders’ “investment in the Coca-Cola Company.”84 This 
stated strategy did not change for the next fifteen years: in every report from 1984-
1999, the opening line of the management’s discussion of financial reports reads, 
“Management’s primary objective is to maximize shareholder value over time.”85 
KO unambiguously defined ‘shareholder value’ in their annual reports. From the 
first use of the term in 1983 until 2000, KO consistently defined an increase in 
shareholder value as the boosting of earnings per share and return on equity. The 
intended result was for shareholders to receive “an above average total return on 
their investment.”86 In 1987 the management devoted multiple pages of the annual 
report to explaining how KO creates shareholder value. In this description the 
management emphasised increasing returns on capital expenditures and maximising  
                                                 
82 The Coca-Cola Company 1983 Annual Report (p. 32) 
83 The Coca-Cola Company 1984 Annual Report (p. 1) 
84 Ibid (p. 4). 
85 There are two exceptions: In 1996 the line read, “We exist for one reason: to maximize share-
owner value over time” and in 1997 “to increase share-owner value” was the management’s 
“mission”. 
86 The Coca-Cola Company 1983 Annual Report (p. 32) 
 
 
FIGURE 3 
USAGE FREQUENCY OF ‘SHAREHOLDER VALUE’: GE, 1960-2000 
Source: GE Annual Reports from ProQuest Historical Annual Reports database 
 
FIGURE 4 
USAGE FREQUENCY OF ‘SHAREHOLDER VALUE’: JNJ, 1960-2000 
Source: JNJ Annual Reports from ProQuest Historical Annual Reports database 
 
 
FIGURE 5 
USAGE FREQUENCY OF ‘SHAREHOLDER VALUE’: KO, 1960-2000 
Source: KO Annual Reports from ProQuest Historical Annual Reports database 
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cash flows, a strategy that would result in management’s ability to pay more 
dividends and repurchase KO stock. 
KO’s approach to the shareholder value concept is thus more deliberate than that 
of Bendix, Dart & Kraft, or R.J. Reynolds Industries. These managers clearly 
understood and sought to increase their conception of ‘shareholder value’, but KO 
goes a step further and makes shareholder value the focal point of management 
strategy. KO’s definition of shareholder value is also more technical, and it excludes 
some of the non-financial criteria that previous users of the term included. 
 
JOHNSON & JOHNSON 
The use of ‘shareholder value’ in the text of JNJ annual reports is in stark 
contrast to that of KO. Whereas KO management declared the pursuit of shareholder 
value was their primary corporate objective, JNJ declared shareholders to be the 
most unimportant constituency influencing management’s decision making. In 1962 
JNJ published their “Credo,” which stated the order of importance of their various 
stakeholders. JNJ declared that their most important constituency was their customer 
and consumer base, followed in order by their employees, management, 
communities, and finally their shareholders.87 Although JNJ modified the Credo 
between 1963-2000, each version listed shareholders’ interests last.  
It is thus no surprise that ‘shareholder value’ was not as defining a feature for 
JNJ annual reports as it was for those of KO. JNJ’s isolated first use of the term in 
1993 was inexplicit; managers simply anticipated future changes would bring 
“opportunities to build shareholder value” but, as in Bendix and Dart & Kraft’s early 
uses, they failed to explain further.88 Although the next use of the term was in 1996 
and was slightly clearer, it did not elucidate how JNJ specifically intended to create 
shareholder value, nor did it define what is shareholder value. CEO Ralph Larsen 
and Vice Chairman Robert Wilson simply wrote, “shareholder value is created when 
we can successfully fulfil unmet health care needs, while at the same time improving 
people’s lives.”89 To JNJ, shareholder value is merely an afterthought; it is 
something obtained indirectly.90 Although Larsen and Wilson do not commit 
outright to a shareholder value creating strategy in the way that KO’s management 
did, this sentence indicates that JNJ’s bold strategy of customer primacy was not 
independent of the promotion of shareholders’ interests. It is not clear, though, how 
JNJ intended to promote those interests because by 1996 they still had not offered a 
clear definition of ‘shareholder value.’ 
One may argue that by the 1990s it was unnecessary for managers to define 
‘shareholder value’ because by then the term was universally understood and 
established, but this was likely not the case. JNJ’s use of ‘shareholder value’ in 1998 
suggests a completely different understanding of the term compared to the norm. 
Larsen and Wilson boast that in 1998 “total share owner value of Johnson & 
                                                 
87 Johnson & Johnson 1962 Annual Report (p.3) 
88 Johnson & Johnson 1993 Annual Report (p. 5) 
89 Johnson & Johnson 1996 Annual Report (p. 4) 
90 The 1962 JNJ Credo states that only “when these things have been done…” referring to all 
other corporate objectives, “the stockholder should receive a fair return.” 
Johnson’s stock” reached an all-time high of “almost $113 billion.”91 In this instance 
Larsen and Wilson use ‘shareholder value’ as a substitute term for market 
capitalisation, the total value of outstanding shares.92 This definition thus recognises 
stock price appreciation, but it overlooks dividends entirely.  
 
GENERAL ELECTRIC CORPORATION 
GE was the last of the three case study corporations to use ‘shareholder value’ in 
an annual report, and their management used the term the most infrequently of the 
three case studies. GE used “share owner value” just once in both the 1994 and 1995 
annual reports and twice in 1998. Although GE commits the least amount of text to 
the discussion of shareholder value, out of the three case studies their use of the term 
is the most straightforward. In each of these three reports GE refers to shareholder 
value only in the context of stock repurchases and dividend payments.93 In the 1994 
report GE states that the decision to repurchase GE shares was made “after 
evaluating various alternatives to enhance long-term share owner value.”94 The 1995 
report says, “$5.9 billion impacted share owner value”; that value was the sum of 
stock repurchases and dividend payments that year.95 To GE managers, ‘shareholder 
value’ was simply the value of the gains shareholders receive as a result of owning 
GE stock.  
GE management never acknowledged ‘shareholder value’ as an explicit 
corporate strategy. Their reports also offer no evidence that a shareholder-
stakeholder dichotomy existed. On the contrary, GE commits to “involving 
everyone.”96 
 
Usage of ‘shareholder’ in annual reports 
I assume more frequent use of the term ‘shareholder’ reflects increased 
preference for shareholders. F(‘shareholder’) for the three corporations over time 
ostensibly appear erratic, but there is in fact an interesting pattern: usage frequency 
of ‘shareholder’ was higher for each corporation in every year following the 
adoption of ‘shareholder value’ until 2000 compared to before the adoption of the 
term. Thus the arrival of ‘shareholder value’ may have been associated with 
relatively more focus on shareholders in annual reports compared to immediately 
before. 
Each of the three corporations used ‘shareholder’ at least as frequently in the 
1960s and early 1970s as in the 1990s. In these earlier periods, annual reports were 
shorter and a greater percentage of overall content was dedicated to shareholders. It 
was in the 1970s that annual reports began to contain more information pertinent to 
non-shareholding constituencies such as customers. Between 1975-1981 (T-A), the 
audit-adjusted page count value, increased from 15 to 37 for KO and from 26 to 41  
                                                 
91 Johnson & Johnson 1998 Annual Report (p. 6) 
92 The value of JNJ outstanding shares was $113 billion at the end of 1998. 
93 General Electric Company 1994 Annual Report (p. 42); General Electric Company 1995 
Annual Report (p. 43); General Electric Company 1998 Annual Report (p. 3) 
94 General Electric Company 1994 Annual Report (p. 42) 
95 General Electric Company 1995 Annual Report (p. 43) 
96 General Electric Company 1994 Annual Report (p. 3) 
 
FIGURE 6 
USAGE FREQUENCY OF ‘SHAREHOLDER’: GE, 1960-2000 
Source: GE Annual Reports from ProQuest Historical Annual Reports database 
 
FIGURE 7 
USAGE FREQUENCY OF ‘SHAREHOLDER’: JNJ, 1960-2000 
Source: JNJ Annual Reports from ProQuest Historical Annual Reports database 
 
FIGURE 8 
USAGE FREQUENCY OF ‘SHAREHOLDER’: KO, 1960-2000 
Source: KO Annual Reports from ProQuest Historical Annual Reports database 
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for GE.97 The value for JNJ increased earlier, rising from 13 to 36 from 1970-1975. 
Each period that experienced an increase in (T-A) also had a decline in 
F(‘shareholder’).  
It is important to note that use of ‘shareholder value’ was not a prerequisite for 
expressing a commitment to shareholders’ interests in these annual reports. As early 
as 1963 GE mentioned the goal of achieving “reasonable returns to share owners.”98 
Returns to shareholders—that is, dividends and share repurchases—is the exact 
meaning of shareholder value in GE annual reports in the 1990s. Throughout the 
1960s and most of the 1970s, as GE’s use of ‘share owner’ increased in frequency, 
the presence of similar statements suggest that managers made decisions in the 
interest of share owners even though GE never once mentioned ‘share owner value.’ 
 
Usage of ‘profit’ in annual reports 
I assume more frequent use of the term profit is indicative of increased 
preference for shareholder interests because more profit volume results in greater 
potential distributions to shareholders.99  
Although KO’s usage frequency for ‘profit’ does not appear to be correlated over 
time, GE and JNJ exhibit general upward trends. GE’s frequency increased gradually 
and consistently over time. JNJ used the term infrequently until the late 1970s; after 
1980 JNJ usage frequency was higher and more consistent. 
JNJ experienced a large increase in F for ‘profit’ beginning in 1977, one year 
before year DD; after this year usage frequency remained high. There are no other 
noticeable changes in any of the three corporations trends for F(‘profit’) relative to 
years DD, RP, or SH.  
 
Usage of ‘employee’ in annual reports 
 I assume more frequent use of the term ‘employee’ is indicative of increased 
preference for employee interests. This is a valid assumption because in annual 
reports the term ‘employee’ is frequently used when discussing employee salaries, 
benefit programmes, and training. 
GE and JNJ exhibit general downward trends in F(’employee’) from 1960 until 
approximately 1985. After this point F(‘employee’) remains fairly constant for GE 
and increases slowly for JNJ. KO never used the term ‘employee’ in an annual report 
from 1960-1977. Usage frequency remained low after 1977 and there was no 
discernible trend. 
 
Usage of ‘research’ in annual reports 
I assume more frequent use of the term ‘research’ is indicative of increased 
preference for R&D. Annual reports present an opportunity for managers to boast 
about R&D breakthroughs, and a relative increase in the amount of text dedicated to 
R&D discussion would suggest more noteworthy R&D accomplishments. 
  
                                                 
97 (T-A) for JNJ only increased from 36 to 43 in this period. 
98 General Electric Company 1963 Annual Report (p. 10) 
99 Bagwell and Shoven (1989, p. 139) 
 
FIGURE 9 
USAGE FREQUENCY OF ‘PROFIT’: GE, 1960-2000 
Source: GE Annual Reports from ProQuest Historical Annual Reports database  
 
FIGURE 10 
USAGE FREQUENCY OF ‘PROFIT’: JNJ, 1960-2000 
Source: JNJ Annual Reports from ProQuest Historical Annual Reports database  
 
 
FIGURE 11 
USAGE FREQUENCY OF ‘PROFIT’: KO, 1960-2000 
Source: KO Annual Reports from ProQuest Historical Annual Reports database   
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FIGURE 12 
USAGE FREQUENCY OF ‘EMPLOYEE’: GE, 1960-2000 
Source: GE Annual Reports from ProQuest Historical Annual Reports database 
 
FIGURE 13 
USAGE FREQUENCY OF ‘EMPLOYEE’: JNJ, 1960-2000 
Source: JNJ Annual Reports from ProQuest Historical Annual Reports database 
 
FIGURE 14 
USAGE FREQUENCY OF ‘EMPLOYEE’: KO, 1960-2000 
Source: KO Annual Reports from ProQuest Historical Annual Reports database 
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FIGURE 15 
USAGE FREQUENCY OF ‘RESEARCH’: GE, 1960-2000 
Source: GE Annual Reports from ProQuest Historical Annual Reports database 
 
FIGURE 16 
USAGE FREQUENCY OF ‘RESEARCH’: JNJ, 1960-2000 
Source: JNJ Annual Reports from ProQuest Historical Annual Reports database 
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FIGURE 17 
USAGE FREQUENCY OF ‘CUSTOMER: GE, 1960-2000 
Source: GE Annual Reports from ProQuest Historical Annual Reports database 
 
FIGURE 18 
USAGE FREQUENCY OF ‘CUSTOMER: JNJ, 1960-2000 
Source: JNJ Annual Reports from ProQuest Historical Annual Reports database  
 
FIGURE 19 
USAGE FREQUENCY OF ‘CUSTOMER: KO, 1960-2000 
Source: KO Annual Reports from ProQuest Historical Annual Reports database 
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KO is not a research-intensive corporation. Never did their management exceed 
two uses of the term ‘research’ in an annual report. For these reasons I exclude KO 
from this section of analysis. 
GE’s F(‘research’) decreases after 1975, but JNJ’s trend generally increases after 
this date. None of years DD, RP, or SH is a point of noticeable change. 
 
Usage of ‘customer’ in annual reports 
I assume more frequent use of the term ‘customer’ is indicative of increased 
preference for customers. There are notable increases in GE and JNJ’s usage 
frequency for ‘customer’ beginning in approximately 1990; KO’s frequency 
increased slightly earlier in the late 1980s. These increases are some of the clearest 
and largest among any variable mentioned, largely because before increases, use of 
the term was minimal.  
 
Discussion 
I determined when and in what context GE, JNJ, and KO used ‘shareholder 
value’ in annual reports and analysed how managers’ treatment of various corporate 
constituencies in these reports changed from 1960-2000 by analysing changes in 
usage frequency of key terms. This analysis is useful because it offers insight to the 
way corporate managers themselves discussed these constituencies over time.  
Limitations stem from my assumptions and methods. For example, I assume 
usage frequency with for a term representing a constituency is correlates with the 
manager’s positive treatment of that constituency’s interests. Thus I assume any one 
use of a key term is tantamount to another, which may not be the case. A manager 
can convey very strong preferences with a single use of the word. For example, 
despite the fact that KO uses the term ‘shareholder value’ very frequently in the late 
1980s, after just one use of the term in the sentence, “Management’s primary 
objective is to maximize shareholder value over time”100 it is clear what are the KO 
management’s views toward the shareholding constituency. Such bold commitments, 
though, are the exception and not the rule in these reports. 
There is little evidence to support the hypothesis that these three corporations 
directed more attention to shareholders’ interests and less to other stakeholders’ 
interests generally over time. Evidence supporting the hypothesis is limited to GE 
and JNJ’s decreasing F for ‘employee,’ GE’s decreasing F for ‘research,’ and GE’s 
increasing F for ‘profit.’  
 
CASE STUDIES: FINANCIAL STATISTICS 
 
In this section I analyse the trends in GE, JNJ, and KO’s financial statistics to 
determine if the allocation of net income changed from a pattern of retain-and-
reinvest to one of downsize-and-distribute following the adoption of the term 
‘shareholder value’ in annual reports. I define retain-and-reinvest as having a 
relatively high value for REINVEST accompanied by a relatively low value of 
RETURNS; I define downsize-and-distribute as having relatively high value for 
                                                 
100 This sentence appeared in several of KO’s annual reports from 1984-2000. 
RETURNS, accompanied by relatively low value of REINVEST. Because KO is not a 
research-intensive corporation, I exclude r&d from KO analysis; thus REINVEST for 
KO simply equals ppe. I analyse these financial trends before and after the three 
critical years DD, RP, and SH. 
 
Observations: RETURNS 
Year SH was not a turning point for either GE or JNJ’s value for RETURNS. For 
these corporations, RETURNS is higher at year SH and each year following until 
2000 compared to the 41-year mean. This increase for both corporations, though, 
began prior to year SH. After year SH there is no discernible trend for GE or JNJ’s 
annual value for RETURNS. It is thus not likely that the emergence of ‘shareholder 
value’ in GE and JNJ annual reports was associated with an increase in RETURNS.  
Trends for JNJ and KO have several similar patterns. Their trends for RETURNS 
are broken into three distinct periods. The first is from 1960-1973, when RETURNS 
experienced a general decline, which was approximately twenty percentage points 
for JNJ and thirty for KO. The second is from 1974 until 1984, the year of both 
corporations’ first repurchase. In this period the trend for RETURNS was high, and 
for JNJ RETURNS returned to its full 1960 value. The third period is from 1985-
2000, when RETURNS for these two corporations becomes erratic following year 
RP.101  
 
Observations: REINVEST 
REINVEST is upward sloping at year DD and remains so for at least five years 
following for each of the three corporations. This suggests these three corporations 
are not representative of the downsize-and-distribute narrative at year DD. 
REINVEST trends for JNJ and KO have similar patterns as well. The maximum 
value for REINVEST for JNJ was in 1982; KO’s was only three years later. Before 
reaching these peaks, both trends were generally increasing, and after the peaks the 
trends decline. That the trends for REINVEST consistently decreased following year 
RP for JNJ and at years RP and SH for KO suggests that these two corporations may 
have followed a pattern of downsize-and-distribute following their first share 
repurchase.102  
 GE, on the other hand, actually increased its REINVEST value consistently 
from 1960-2000, suggesting that GE may never actually adopted a downsize-and-
distribute strategy according to my definition. 
 
Discussion 
 I previously established that KO deliberately sought to maximise shareholder 
value whilst JNJ did not. It is thus surprising to find that these two corporations with 
diametrically opposed views of shareholder strategy had such similar patterns in their 
allocation of resources for both RETURNS and REINVEST. Of the three, JNJ over 
  
                                                 
101 I define a trend as relatively more erratic if there is an increase of its standard deviation 
relative to its mean. 
102 Or in the case of KO, the first use of ‘shareholder value’ and the first share repurchase. 
 
FIGURE 20 
GE RETURNS (DIVIDENDS AND REPURCHASES), 1960-2000 
 Source: Compustat database, variables DVT and PRSKTC 
 
FIGURE 21 
JNJ RETURNS (DIVIDENDS AND REPURCHASES), 1960-2000 
Source: Compustate database, variables DVT and PRSKTC 
 
FIGURE 22 
KO RETURNS (DIVIDENDS AND REPURCHASES), 1960-2000 
 Source: Compustate database, variables DVT and PRSKTC 
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FIGURE 23 
GE REINVEST (R&D AND PPE), 1960-2000 
Source: R&D data from GE annual reports; PPE data from Compustat database, variable CAPX 
 
 
FIGURE 24 
JNJ REINVEST (R&D AND PPE), 1960-2000 
Source: R&D data from JNJ annual reports; PPE data from Compustat database, variable CAPX 
 
 
FIGURE 25 
KO PPE, 1960-2000 
Note: KO R&D data are unavailable in annual reports and Compustat database 
Source: PPE data from Compustat database, variable CAPX 
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time best represents the downsize-and-distribute theme because of its obvious 
decrease in REINVEST and increase in RETURNS. 
Although this general trend for GE and JNJ indeed represents Lazonick’s 
narrative of downsize-and-distribute, it is unlikely that changes in behaviour were 
associated with the shareholder value concept. The year SH is almost entirely 
irrelevant as a turning point either for the RETURNS or REINVEST trend. 
In fact, the only instance in which year SH is relevant for any variable is for the 
GE’s RETURNS trend: from 1994-2000 GE’s RETURNS actually decreased by thirty 
percentage points, in other words the exact opposite behaviour compared to that 
described in the downsize-and-distribute narrative.103 
This analysis is unable to support the hypothesis that GE, JNJ, or KO adopted 
downsize-and-distribute behaviour following adoption of ‘shareholder value’ in their 
annual reports.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Previous studies documenting the rise of ‘shareholder value’ have demonstrated 
two independent points about corporate activity from 1960-2000: (1) corporate 
pursuit of ‘shareholder value’ arose as a new management strategy; (2) corporate 
allocation of income increasingly favoured shareholders, sometimes at the expense 
of other stakeholders. This study, while offering evidence suggesting both these 
points are valid, applies qualitative microeconomic evidence to determine if a 
relationship exists between points (1) and (2) as some shareholder value narratives 
suggest.  
In the first part of this study I investigated when ‘shareholder value’ emerged in 
managerial lexicons. I found that managers’ frequent use of ‘shareholder value’ 
began in my sample of annual reports in approximately 1983. The percentage of 
corporations using the term increased until approximately 1995, when usage of the 
term in annual reports reached its pre-2000 peak. This suggests that although the 
term ‘shareholder value’ did emerge in the 1980s, it was not until the 1990s that use 
of term became truly widespread. 
This finding casts serious doubts on narratives connecting macroeconomic trends 
of the 1970s and 1980s to the rise of ‘shareholder value’. Several central components 
of Lazonick’s narrative in particular need to be addressed or refined. He argues that 
increased income inequality, higher executive compensation, and higher levels of 
disgorgement of corporate cash occurred as a result of the rise of ‘shareholder 
value.’104 But each of these trends predates the rise of the term ‘shareholder value’. 
For income inequality, the top decile and percentile income shares in the United 
States had already begun to rise before 1983105; they had risen precipitously by 1988, 
when I argue ‘shareholder value’ was still in its infancy.106  Executive pay began to 
                                                 
103 1983-1984 were important years for the trends of KO, but it is impossible to separate from SH 
from RP. 
104 Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000; Lazonick 2014) 
105 See, for example, Piketty and Saez (2001, Figures 19 and 20, p. 80-81) 
106 Ibid. 
increase in approximately 1970, well before the emergence of ‘shareholder value’.107 
Cash disgorgement as increases in dividends and stock repurchases as a share of net 
income for U.S. corporations was already elevated in 1980 and rose quickly during 
the years when the earliest users of ‘shareholder value’ adopted the term.108 
The second part of this study investigated if ‘shareholder value’ influenced 
corporate strategy and governance. My case study analyses of The Coca-Cola 
Company, General Electric Company, and Johnson & Johnson demonstrates that 
adoption of shareholder value rhetoric had little or no impact on the way these 
corporations addressed various corporate constituencies in their annual reports, nor 
did it influence their preference for reinvesting net income in the corporation versus 
disgorging it to shareholders through dividends and repurchases. 
Of these three corporations, the one that most represented downsize-and-
distribute behaviour over the period was Johnson & Johnson, which rarely used the 
term ‘shareholder value’ and deliberately declared shareholder interests below all 
others. This suggests that, at least for Johnson & Johnson, behaviour described ex 
post as shareholder value maximisation did not occur out of a deliberate commitment 
to shareholder interests. More microeconomic analysis of management decisions is 
needed to obtain a more complete understanding of how ‘shareholder value’ 
influenced corporate managers’ decisions. 
Some may ask why it matters to distinguish shareholder value maximising 
behaviour from shareholder value maximisng rhetoric. Absent use of the term 
‘shareholder value’, behaviour described ex post as pursuing shareholder value may 
actually have been unintentional. Without evidence of management’s adoption of the 
term ‘shareholder value’, it is difficult to reasonably assert that the concept played a 
part in corporate strategy and decision-making in this period. As a result, by 
overemphasising the role  of ‘shareholder value’ scholars likely underemphasise 
other factors that contributed to these macroeconomic trends.  
Just as Monsieur Jourdain was flabbergasted upon discovering that for forty 
years he had been speaking prose, corporate managers not using of the term in the 
1980s and 1990s would have been shocked to read these recent narratives and learn 
that for years they been pursuing ‘shareholder value.’109 
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